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ABSTRACT Drawing upon mainly qualitative inquiry with political, associative and economic
actors over a two-decade long period, the article seeks to provide answers to a key conundrum
that challenges, in different ways, territorial politics scholars, as well as those working primarily on
France. What are the conditions for a successful form of regional advocacy in a unitary state? The
French region of Brittany has a speciﬁc mode of operation, one based on mixing identity and
instrumental claims, and accessing a repertoire of responses that are not naturally open to other
French regions. A related question follows logically from the ﬁrst: Can a speciﬁc territorial
model developed in one set of conditions adapt when circumstances change? The Breton case
demonstrates limited evidence of endogenous change (a central tenet of discursive institutional-
ism), though it does admit a continuing capacity to ﬁlter external pressures in a way that makes
sense to regional actors. Analytically, the article develops territorial political capacity as a part
material, part constructed framework that can be used for comparing regions at a particular
point in time, as well as for capturing the evolution over time of a speciﬁc region.
EXTRACTO A partir de principalmente entrevistas cualitativas con protagonistas políticos, aso-
ciativos y económicos durante un periodo de dos décadas, la ﬁnalidad de este artículo es
ofrecer respuestas a un enigma clave que desafía, de maneras diferentes, a eruditos políticos ter-
ritoriales, y los que en su trabajo se centran sobre todo en Francia. ¿Cuáles son las condiciones
para conseguir un tipo de apoyo regional que tenga éxito en un Estado unitario? La región fran-
cesa de Bretaña tiene una modalidad especíﬁca de funcionamiento basada en combinar reivindi-
caciones identitarias e instrumentales, y acceder a un abanico de respuestas que normalmente no
están abiertas a otras regiones francesas. La primera cuestión lleva de forma lógica a otra cuestión
relacionada: ¿puede un modelo territorial determinado que se ha creado bajo una serie de con-
diciones adaptarse cuando cambian las circunstancias? El caso bretón demuestra poca evidencia
de un cambio endógeno (un principio central de la institucionalidad discursiva), aunque
admite una capacidad continua para ﬁltrar las presiones externas de un modo acorde con los pro-
tagonistas regionales. Analíticamente, en el artículo se desarrolla la capacidad política territorial
como una estructura parcialmente material y parcialmente construida que puede utilizarse para
comparar regiones en un momento dado, y para captar la evolución con el paso del tiempo de
una región especíﬁca.
摘要 本文主要是以质性研究，对政治、联合与经济行动者进行为期二十年之久的探
问，企图藉此对一个关键难题提出解答，该难题以不同的方式，挑战了地域政治学者
和以法国为主要研究对象的学者。在单一国家中，成功的区域倡议形式的条件为何？
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不列塔尼的法语区，则具有一种特殊的操作模式，该模式建立在混合身份认同与工具
性的要求，以及取得并非自然对其他法国区域开放的全部回应的基础之上。一开始便
随之而来的相关逻辑问题是：在一组条件中建构的特定地域模型，当面临境况改变
时，是否能够进行调试？不列塔尼的案例，显示出内生改变的有限证据（论述制度主
义的核心原则），但该案例却承认了以对区域行动者而言有道理的方式来筛选外在压
力的持续能力。在分析方面，本文将地域政治能力发展成为部分是物质、部分是建构
的框架，并可用来在特定的时间点上比较区域、以及捕捉特定区域随着时间的演化。
RÉSUMÉ Puisant principalement dans une enquête qualitative auprès des acteurs politiques, asso-
ciatifs et économiques sur une période de vingt années, l’article cherche à fournir des réponses à un
dilemme clé qui représente, de manière différente, un déﬁ aux chercheurs dans le domaine de la
politique territoriale, ainsi qu’à ceux qui poursuivent des recherches sur la France. Quelles sont
les conditions préalables dans un État unitaire qui sont indispensables pour la création d’une
forme réussie de plaidoyer régional? La région française de Bretagne a unmode particulier de fonc-
tionnement, fondé sur une mixité de propositions quant à l’identité et de nature instrumentale, et
ayant accès à un répertoire de réponses qui ne sont pas par nature à la portée des autres régions. Une
question connexe découle logiquement de la première: est-ce qu’un modèle territorial spéciﬁque
mis au point dans certaines conditions peut s’adapter aumoment où les conditions changent? Le cas
de la Bretagne démontre que rares sont les preuves du changement endogène (un principe fonda-
mental de l’institutionnalisme discursif), bien qu’il reconnaisse une capacité continue d’éliminer les
pressions externes d’une manière qui est logique aux yeux des acteurs régionaux. Du point de vue
analytique, l’article développe la notion de capacité politique territoriale comme un cadre, moitié
matériel, moitié construit, dont on peut se servir pour comparer les régions à un moment donné,
ainsi que pour capter dans le temps l’évolution d’une région particulière.
KEYWORDS devolution regions Europe territory new regionalism multi-level
governance politics
INTRODUCTION
Drawing upon extensive qualitative inquiry with leading political, associative and econ-
omic actors in the French region of Brittany over a period of almost two decades, the
article seeks to provide answers to a key conundrum that challenges, in different ways, ter-
ritorial politics scholars, as well as those working primarily on France. What are the con-
ditions for a successful form of regional advocacy in a unitary state? A related question
follows logically from the ﬁrst: Can a speciﬁc territorial model (the ‘Bretonmodel’) devel-
oped in one set of conditions adapt when circumstances change? Brittany is arguably the
best case in France to demonstrate successful forms of regional advocacy (as opposed to
ethnic nationalism (the case in Corsica) or the dynamics of metropolitan governance
(Lyon)). A sense of regional identity is a constant across the period, measured both by
responses within the political and policy community and by survey evidence. This
article draws upon interviews carried out by the authors at three distinct stages in the
recent past: in 1995, from 2001 to 2002 and in 2013.1 A representative survey was also
commissioned in 2001, and Brittany formed part of the cross-national Citizenship after
theNation State (CANS) survey in 2009.2 The article develops territorial political capacity
as an operational concept for comparing regions and for capturing the evolution over time
of a speciﬁc region. Though the level of analysis is territorially speciﬁc (the administrative
region of Brittany), the approach is sufﬁciently generic to be used in other regions and is
being explored in cognate surveys of Andalucía (Spain), Wales (UK) and Wallonia
(Belgium).3 We now present territorial political capacity as a framework for analysis.
2 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
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THE TERRITORIAL POLITICAL CAPACITY FRAMEWORK
Territorial governance can be deﬁned as the set of formal and informal structures and
processes that contribute to the governing of a given territory (SIMOULIN, 2013,
pp. 3–25). Regions and cities, at the heart of reﬂections about contemporary territorial
governance, produce the strongest territorial narratives (BRENNER, 2004; KEATING, 2008;
LE GALÈS, 2012; PASQUIER et al., 2013; STORPER, 2013). Cities and regions are both
affected by similar dynamic forces: economic globalisation, European integration and
the reform of the state in a context of diminishing state capacity and resources
(KEATING, 1998; HOOGHE and MARKS, 2001; PASQUIER, 2012). These macro parameters
create new opportunities for some cities, regions and other territorial actors, but also
impose new constraints and forms of political and economic uncertainty.
Different theoretical grids have been proposed to analyse the dynamics of territorial
governance (see PASQUIER et al., 2013, for an exhaustive literature review). Our preferred
framework, territorial political capacity, is brieﬂy presented in this article. Territorial pol-
itical capacity has both a material and a more constructed dimension. The framework
combines hard and soft variables: potential indicators of regional capacity sometimes
Table 1. The territorial political capacity framework.
Political capacity Constructed (Brittany) Material Evidence
Material
Institutional resources Imagined territorial
assembly
Legal competencies and
ﬁnances
The legal status of the region
The ﬁscal structure of sub-
national budgets
Economic proﬁle Narrative of spatial
isolation
Fiscal capacity, GDP per
head, wealth of public
and private partners
Ofﬁcial Statistics (INSEE,
OECD)
Mixed
Inter-governmental
relations (IGRs) and
multi-level
governance
Repertoire of strategies
to press the Breton
cause in multi-level
arena
Instrumental use of
identity in dealings with
Paris; strategic
Europeanisation
Case studies of speciﬁc
examples of the Breton
interest: the high-speed
train; the refusal to merge
with Pays de la Loire region,
2014
Political leadership Pursuing the Breton
interest by leadership
Long-term regional
collective leadership
Role of ﬁrst-rank leaders
operating mainly in Paris/
Brussels
Party system Pursuing the Breton
interest by party
A powerful regionalist
party? Regional
advocacy within
existing parties?
Inﬂuence in state-wide parties
(PS, UMP), little evidence
of split voting
Territorial regimes Pursuing the Breton
interest by
association
Region-centric networks? Spatial planning, inter-
governmental lobbying and
EU regional policy
processes
Constructed
Identity logics Sense of belonging,
identiﬁcation of self
Comparison with other
French and European
regions
‘Moreno’ scale identiﬁes a dual
identity
Territorial narratives Regional discursive
‘common good’.
Breton negotiations as a
two-level game
The 2013 ‘red bonnet’
movement conﬁrmed key
features of the territorial
action repertoire
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require quantitative data and sometimes mobilise qualitative evidence. We select eight
indicators of territorial political capacity which can each have a material, as well as a con-
structed dimension (though, as described, they lie more or less in one camp and are ana-
lysed in this way). These indicators are brieﬂy presented in Table 1 and discussed more
fully in the main body of the article.
The framework and its indicators are best understood in terms of a continuum rather
than a set of hermetic positions. Mainly material indicators include institutions and insti-
tutional resources (What is the degree of self-rule?); and economic proﬁles (the econ-
omic well-being of a region and its ranking relative to other places). Mixed material
and constructed indicators include styles of IGRs and multi-level governance (e.g. Do
regions engage with strategic Europeanisation?), the party system (Can we identify a
regionalisation of the party system or regional advocacy in central government?), politi-
cal leadership (Is there a form of (regional) territorial political leadership?) and, ﬁnally, the
operation of territorial regimes (Is there a consensus between political, economic and
associative actors?). Mainly constructed indicators include territorial identity (Is the
regional space underpinned by a (regional) territorial identity or not?); and territorial nar-
ratives (Is there a coherent shared view on the nature of the challenges facing the region,
or a shared repertoire of responses?). The mix of material and constructed indicators is
used to provide insights from one particular region, Brittany, that has been observed
closely over two decades.
The general framework is used here to study one strong identity region over time, but
it ought to have a more general usage. Comparing city governments, for example, also
involves combining material and constructed variables (economic dynamism, formal
legal competencies, ﬁscal autonomy and capacity, the party system, city visions and tra-
ditions, forms of urban political leadership, urban coalitions and narratives of the city’s
common good). In the case of city governments, or city regions, the balance between
these variables is very likely to be different; stand-alone ﬁscal autonomy, for example,
is much more likely to be a fundamental source of differentiation than in the case of
one strong identity region. How this framework might be operationalised is now con-
sidered in relation to the case of the French region of Brittany.
THE BRETON MODEL BETWEEN CONVERGENCE AND CAPACITY
Brittany is one of France’s most distinctive regions (MCDONALD, 1989; FORD, 1993; LE
GALÈS, 1993; LE BOURDENNEC, 1996; LE COADIC, 1998; PASQUIER, 2004; GEMIE, 2007;
NICOLAS, 2012; LE COADIC, 2013). Though the symbols of statehood of this former
Duchy have long been suppressed, the region retains many distinguishing characteristics.
The Breton language is the European continent’s only Celtic language. The spectacular
growth of Breton cultural movements (music, dance, theatre and costume) is testament
to a revival of Breton values and self-consciousness. A Breton political model is com-
monly identiﬁed as being based on cross-partisan consensus and regional advocacy, a
post-war model of public action that was built upon inter-war failure of a more asser-
tively nationalist movement. Breton perspectives across the political spectrum continue
to be shaped by the spatial challenges of Brittany (at the far-western tip of the European
continent), and claims for the legitimate delivery of public goods by the French state and
by the European Union (EU). For several decades after the SecondWorldWar, a Breton
economic model, based on a mode of economic production that is diffused across the
Breton peninsula, was proposed as a source of emulation for other peripheral regions
(PHLIPPONEAU, 1993; OLLIVRO, 2005). We have argued elsewhere that Brittany scores
highly in terms of institutional inter-connectivity and social and cultural capital,
4 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
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embodied by traditions of inter-communal co-operation, close informal relationships
between regional politicians and representatives of the state ﬁeld services, a vibrant
associative life, strong electoral participation and robust social networks (PASQUIER,
2004; COLE, 2006).
How useful is the territorial political capacity framework for understanding the case of
Brittany? This section mainly considers the changing material dimension of the Breton
model; in the next section, we explore whether the social construction of Brittany can
provide a resource to tackle economic uncertainty. The core argument is developed,
mainly inductively, around three phases of empirical data gathering, in 1995, 2001–
2002 and 2013–2014. The largely positive framing of the Breton model is mainly
based on the 1995 and 2001–2002 interviews; the decline of the Breton model is the
main organising theme for the latest round of interviews in 2013–2014.
Institutional Resources
Institutional resources are the most obvious indicator of territorial political capacity. The
most inﬂuential instrument in the past decade has been that of the Regional Authority
Index (henceforth RAI), which draws on the work of ELAZAR (1991) and disaggregates
regional authority into a set of dimensions for self-rule and shared rule (HOOGHE et al.,
2010, p. 6). Self-rule is operationalised as ‘the extent to which a regional government has
an independent executive, the scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax and
the extent to which it has an independent legislature’. Shared rule, the ‘capacity of a
regional government to shape central decision making’, is disaggregated across four
dimensions: law-making, executive control, ﬁscal control and constitutional reform.
A narrow reading of the RAI would not place Brittany very high in the European
hierarchy, or, for that matter, any other French region. The RAI measures the self-
rule axis in terms of an independent executive, the scope of its policy competencies,
its capacity to tax and the extent to which it has an independent legislature. In the case
of Brittany, the regional council does not approximate an independent executive
(unlike, for example, the Welsh or Scottish governments); indeed, the region has
no hierarchical authority over other levels of sub-national government, the 101
departments or the 36500 communes. The policy competencies of 22 French
regions have traditionally been limited. If the regions gained new responsibilities in
the 2003 decentralisation reform, the departments emerged with more staff, policy
responsibilities and budgets. French regions have limited ﬁscal capacity, which we
deﬁne in terms of having access to a wide tax base, some freedom in setting tax
rates and borrowing capacity. Initially able to exercise a measure of ﬁscal autonomy,
the French regions (including Brittany) now depend upon central government trans-
fers or formulae for over 90% of their resources and are strictly limited in their ability
to levy taxes.4 Finally, thus far Brittany has had nothing approximating an indepen-
dent legislature. In the run-up to the decentralisation reform announced for June
2014, the Brittany regional council and leading Breton parliamentarians (J.-J.
Urvoas) called for a Breton territorial assembly with secondary legislative powers,
along the lines of the UK’s devolved assemblies. The outcome of this demand was
unknown at the time of writing.
The score sheet is meagre, but it is necessary to understand informal institutions to
make full sense of the Breton model. Informal institutions have taken three main
forms: a mode of close co-operation between regional and regional state actors; a
region-centric mode of territorial governance and a close synergy between political,
business and associative actors (see below). There is a long tradition of collaboration
The Breton Model Between Convergence and Capacity 5
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between state and regional elites going back to the early post-war period which remains
present in the discourse of actors. In an interview in 2013, one key collaborator
explained how one regional Prefect had been ‘socialised’ into the Breton way:
I have known three prefects. At the beginning, the second one was ﬁrmly of the belief
that ‘the State decides alone’, but by the time he left he was a strong supporter of the
Breton system of a dialogue between the State and the local authorities.5
This example could be repeated with several others drawn from earlier testimony.
There is, second, a mode of regional regulation, whereby the regional council has
long adopted a leadership role among cities and departments in Brittany, a mode of
regional governance that has no real equivalent elsewhere in France. This regional lea-
dership role is well illustrated by the B16 process.6 Regional leadership has been facili-
tated by the absence of a powerful city mobilising metropolitan functions. Brittany’s
post-war economic revival was attributed by some political geographers to a polycentric
model of spatial development (PHLIPPONEAU, 1993; OLLIVRO, 2005). Even after continu-
ous post-war growth, the regional capital Rennes remains only one of several medium-
sized Breton towns. These towns, with their dense tissue of small and medium enter-
prises, include Redon, Vitré, St Brieuc, Lannion, Brest, Morlaix, Vannes, Quimper,
Lorient and several smaller places. This balanced model of economic development has
been challenged by economic globalisation and the impact of the post-2008 crisis,
which has had a detrimental effect on towns such as Lannion (telecoms), Brest
(defence), Lorient (agri-food) and even Rennes (the automobile industry). Globalisation
provides opportunities for a few regions and cities able to incarnate the new modernity
in international competition. But economic globalisation also creates losers; this process
has gathered pace since the 2008 crisis and is reﬂected in some senses in our Breton case
study.
Economic Proﬁle
Economic dynamism and more generally economic well-being are fundamental con-
cerns for understanding the political capacity of regions. The stronger regions of the
European continent are also those that enjoy a signiﬁcant level of economic growth
(Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Basque Country, Flanders, Rhône-Alpes and northern
Italy). In a globalised context ‘where the supply chains and knowledge networks are
not locationally restricted’ (AMIN, 2004, p. 36), certain authors have refused the
notion of the region as a closed territorial unit. They have instead adopted a relational
and permeable conception of the region in terms of networks and interdependencies
(ALLEN et al., 1998; AMIN, 2004). As MORGAN (2007) rightly points out, however,
regional political spaces continue to have borders in the sense that political representa-
tives are obliged to conceive elections in territorial terms; and for this simple and prosaic
reason alone the postmodern geographer should not lose sight of the political within ter-
ritorial policies.
Is there a linkage between material and constructed capacity? There is certainly a
material basis to regional identity: the most autonomist-minded European regions are
usually those with a more developed sense of material capacity, richer regions such as
Catalonia, Flanders, Bavaria, Lombardy and (in some respects) Scotland. Wealthy
regions and ‘region-states’ have greater capacity to impose their interests than poor
regions (OHMAE, 1993). Such regions often demand greater stand-alone ﬁscal autonomy,
resent welfare transfers to poorer places and sometimes advocate enhanced territorial
autonomy. These richer regions constitute an exceptional family of European regions.
6 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
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In our comparative framework, Brittany (along with the cases of Andalusia, Wales and
Wallonia) forms part of another family of European regions that we label as ‘second-
order strong identity’ regions. This family of regions share many characteristics. They
are economically challenged yet have a distinctive and developed territorial identity.
They each have traditions of social-democratic party control. They are traditionally
pro-European regions, or at least regions beneﬁting from substantial EU investment.
Though these regions exercise limited control over core macro-economic levers, and
a fragile basis for enhanced material capacity, they sustain a coherent territorial narrative
that mixes signiﬁers from the centre–periphery and the left–right axes.
The rapid demographic and economic expansion of Brittany during the post-war
period was remarkable. From being the poorest French region in 1945, Brittany was
in the second quartile of French regions in 2013 in terms of GDP per head (INSEE,
2013). The post-war period was marked by heavy inward investment into the region,
mainly from the French state, but also by foreign direct investment and the EU (PHLIP-
PONEAU, 1993; OLLIVRO, 2005). Brittany enjoyed strong rates of economic growth, testa-
ment to the modernisation of its agricultural sector, external investment in high
technology sectors such as telecommunications, defence and health and a speciﬁc
pattern of multipolar spatial development. Brittany is today France’s principal farm
export region and a leader in the agri-food industry. In a material sense, however, the
Breton miracle has turned sour since the early 2000s, though economic decline is felt
more keenly in west and central than in the eastern Brittany. The 2013 round of inter-
views occurred at a time of economic crisis, especially severe in the farming and agri-food
businesses. The key underpinnings of the Breton economic model were under threat.
The advantages identiﬁed in earlier decades had, by 2013, been transformed into
heavy economic constraints. State-led investment in the telecoms and automotive indus-
tries had concentrated industrial capacity, so much so that economic decline in these
sectors shook the model to its foundations. The highly intensive Breton agricultural
model was showing signs of diminishing economic returns at a very high environmental
cost. The European attachment was called into question by a series of high-proﬁle EU
challenges to the underlying Breton economy. The ending of EU subsidies for the
poultry industry in summer 2013 came as a rude awakening. In the opinion of one inter-
locutor, the Breton model had ‘failed to reinvent itself when it could’.7 The mass strikes
and the direct action undertaken in Autumn 2013 were signs of a radical disenchantment.
The decline of the Breton model is in part a material reality, based on a weakening in
the core economic markets of traditional post-war growth (farm products and agri-food
business), a threatened natural environment (with a knock-on effect on tourism) and cut
backs in production in the key automotive, telecommunications, IT and defence indus-
trial sectors. Material decline ought to be relativised, however. Brittany remains in the
second quartile of French regions in terms of GDP and other regions (Languedoc-Rous-
sillon, for example) have fared far worse since the economic downturn. The decline is
most apparent in terms of constructed image and capacity; the ability of the Breton
model to deliver public goods has been called into question, as much by self-doubt as
by the diminishing ability of central government to engage in ﬁscal transfers. The
French state’s ability to deliver side payments has been challenged by the rise of
global markets (with stiff competition for French food producers from Brazilian or
German ﬁrms), by EU regulation (in the area of public services), by diminishing
French macro-economic capacity and by tougher budgetary rules.
The shift in Breton attitudes can be mapped by comparing the answers of the 2001–
2002 and 2013 interviews. All correspondents were asked, in an open-ended question,
what they considered to be the main policy problems facing Brittany in the years ahead.
The Breton Model Between Convergence and Capacity 7
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In the 2001–2002 round, three types of response came ahead of others: ﬁrst, problems
related to the environment; second, the need for more regional economic development
and third the need for a strengthening of the powers for the regional council. Responses
to the policy challenges question in 2013 suggested a weakening of the Breton model,
and a sense of uncertainty about what might replace it. The crisis of the Breton model in
general and the agricultural and food production sectors in particular was identiﬁed as the
major challenge. There was a deep sense of pessimism about the future of intensive agri-
culture, inspired by the massive layoffs or plant closures in 2013 at food producers Doux,
Tilly-Sabco and Gad. Potential responses varied from developing more quality, niche
products, to assuming a more protectionist stance against foreign and European compe-
tition, to diversifying away from agriculture. A secondary challenge was identiﬁed in
terms of environmental damage and its effects on tourism and marine biology. The
Breton ‘economic miracle’, based in part on intensive agricultural methods, had endan-
gered one of Brittany’s greatest assets, its reputation for unspoiled natural products.
There is no simple correlation between economic resources and territorial political
capacity. If richer regions can develop more autonomous strategies, such responses do
not always occur. The less economically advanced regions in our sample are able to
mobilise on the left–right and centre–periphery cleavages and use territorial identity
to support resource redistribution claims. Both cases represent a form of territorial pol-
itical capacity construction. This observation strengthens the analytical point that com-
parison should occur on the basis of ‘family resemblances’ (COLLIER and MAHON, 1993)
—comparing in categories such as cities, ﬁrst- and second-order strong identity regions,
rural zones—rather than in terms of context-blind variables.
Modes of IGRs and Multi-level Governance
In the RAI, shared rule is described as the ‘capacity of a regional government to shape
central decision making’ and disaggregated across four dimensions: law-making, execu-
tive control, ﬁscal control and constitutional reform (HOOGHE et al., 2010, p. 115). The
French regions would appear weak on most of these criteria: there is no shared law-
making via a second chamber representing state interests (as in the case of Germany or
some other federal states). There are no formal mechanisms of executive control.
There is no share in determining national levels of taxes (as in the Basque Country and
Navarre in Spain) and no formal input into constitutional reform (though the agreement
of the second chamber, the Senate, is in practice required for any constitutional reform).
Focusing on formal variables does not capture actual processes of inter-governmental
lobbying that, by their nature, are less open to formal observation and measurement
than the RAI suggests.
Lobbying the French state (and the EU) for increased resources to rescue Brittany
from its isolated geographical position has formed a core feature of the Breton repertoire
for several decades. Several interviewees in 1995 and 2001 spoke of a Breton ‘network’
in Paris, actively defending Breton interests in the main ministries; by 2013, Bretons
were running many of these ministries (ROUDAUT, 2013). From 1950 onwards,
Breton actors co-operated closely in the CELIB—Comité de d’étude et de liaison des
intérêts bretons—which brought together politicians from all parties, along with pro-
fessional and economic interests to promote the interests of the region. Under the
impetus of CELIB, Brittany was the ﬁrst French region to publish a regional plan (in
1953), calling for industrialisation and improved transport facilities (MARTRAY, 1983).
The lobbying activity was crowned with success, as the French state poured massive
resources into Brittany from the late 1950s onwards. Interviews with surviving actors
8 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
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and published historical accounts demonstrate that instrumentalist ends (bringing a back-
ward region into national productivity) coexisted within the CELIB with a high degree
of regional consciousness, a desire for powerful regional political institutions and a will-
ingness to consider direct action to further Breton ends.8 The sometimes instrumental
use of identity is a constant of the Breton policy style, reafﬁrmed regularly in the past
50 years.
The second core feature of the Breton (interactional) model is a strategic engagement
with the EU. Interviewees across the three periods stressed the fundamentally pro-Euro-
pean sentiment existing within Brittany, with Europe part of the Breton ‘DNA’.9 In the
immediate post-war period, Breton politicians were quick to recognise the opportunities
implicit in European integration for a spatially peripheral, economically disadvantaged
and politically contested region.10 Catholicism remained powerful and inﬂuential in
Brittany at least until the 1960s (ROHOU, 2012). In part, the region’s pro-European
engagement was a general consequence of the modernisation agenda of the Catholic
Church and, more speciﬁcally, the political inﬂuence of Christian democracy. The
Christian democratic, pro-European legacy has a long pedigree and its values are still
daily propagated by Ouest France, the leading local newspaper. Along with Alsace
and Lorraine, Brittany was the strongest pro-Maastricht region in France, with these
three regions securing the victory of the Yes vote in the 1992 referendum. Brittany
was one of the only regions to vote Yes in the 2005 constitutional treaty referendum.
The region has been a key French beneﬁciary of EU structural funds and the
Common Agricultural Policy.
The territorial political capacity framework also contributes to debates about Eur-
opeanisation. CARTER and PASQUIER (2010) identify strategic Europeanisation as being
one response to European integration that can empower regions in terms of their
own identity, strategy and networks. Strategic Europeanisation emphasises regions as
actors, capable of reﬁning their own EU strategies. In contrast to strategic Europeanisa-
tion, CARTER and PASQUIER (2010) identify normative Europeanisation as the process
whereby domestic laws and regulations are adapted to conform to EU directives and
rules. Such top-down Europeanisation is typically analysed in terms of reception, of
adaptation, of goodness of ﬁt, or conforming to European templates and best practice.
The practice of strategic Europeanisation has strengthened internal cohesion across
Brittany. In 2005, the regional president Le Drian created a ‘European conference’,
which brings together the four departments and the main cities of Brittany to deﬁne
common positions around European issues. Within the conference a consensus soon
emerged that any European funds should be used to co-ﬁnance the high-speed rail
line from Brest to Paris. Via their ofﬁce in Brussels (rebaptised the ‘Breton Embassy’
from 2006), and a certain amount of informal horse-trading in Paris and Brussels, the
Breton representatives worked together, with the support of the French government,
to achieve advances in two areas: that rail transport would be included in the ‘competi-
tiveness’ operational programmes; and, most importantly, that the calculation of ‘Lisbon’
earmarked funds be carried out at national rather than regional level. This political agree-
ment that Le Drian managed to obtain from Danita Hübner, Commissioner for
Regional Affairs, went against the advice of the Directorate-General for Regional and
Urban Policy.11 The agreement enabled Brittany to receive 100 million euros from
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) to co-fund the high-speed rail
line, nearly a third of its ERDF envelope in 2007–2013. This example epitomises a
proactive regional strategy that has engaged with Europe over several decades. The
established framework of interaction with the Commission, the unanimity that regional
actors demonstrate concerning the major issues of regional development and the
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perception of European civil servants that there are speciﬁc Breton interests are the
deﬁning elements in ensuring Breton representatives a certain inﬂuence over particular
European decisions.
Has (Breton) territorial capacity been undermined by a shift from strategic to norma-
tive Europeanisation? One of the core novelties of the 2013 round of interviews related
to disillusion with the EU as an institution (though not with the European ideal). The
‘neo-liberal’ European model of the Barroso Commission was contrasted unfavourably,
in one interview with a UMP (Union pour une majorité populaire) parliamentarian,
with the traditional Breton model of partnership, co-operation and support for public
services.12 The EU was associated with the downturn in Brittany’s fortunes (though cer-
tainly not as the principal cause). The drying up of EU structural funds had removed a
source of regional investment. The sense of relative deprivation was aggravated by the
EUCommission placing obstacles in the way of direct aids from the French government.
Above all the eco-taxe, the symbol of the Breton revolt of 2013, was implemented by
French governments, but justiﬁed on the basis of an EU directive. The immediate fate of
Brittany’s poultry producers—Gad, Tilly-Sabco, Doux—had been made worse by the
end of EU restitutions in July 2013.13 Several interviewees blamed the EU for allowing
German and Brazilian ﬁrms (accused of social dumping and producing food and poultry
below cost) unfair access to Brittany’s traditional markets. This new tension between
strategic and normative Europeanisation has weakened somewhat the European vision
of Breton elites, but most criticism is directed against the French central state and its inca-
pacity to reform the economy. In May 2014, the charismatic leader of the red bonnet
movement, Christian Troadec, was also the head of a list for the European elections
defending the federalist project of a Europe of regions.
The Party System and the Breton Interest
One dimension of (regional) territorial capacity lies in the party system. We identify two
distinct conﬁgurations of regionalisation: ﬁrst, the emergence of territory-speciﬁc (ethno-
territorial) parties as the key parties in regional elections. The politics of ethno-territorial
mobilisation reﬂects itself in sub-state political institutions, distinctive party systems,
language rights movements and cultural traditions (DE WINTER and TURSAN, 1998;
MCEWAN and MORENO, 2005; MORENO, 2007; KERNALEGENN and PASQUIER, 2013).
There is a growing literature on the impact of split voting in ‘post-sovereign’ states.
JONES and SCULLY (2006), for example, demonstrate the differential between voting
for minority nationalist parties (Plaid Cymru, SNP) in devolved and UK-wide elections,
the regionalists performing much better in the territory-speciﬁc elections than at the UK
level where the traditionally unionist Labour Party continues to dominate. A rather
different indicator identiﬁes the weight of regional/nationalist lobbies within the
national parties or national parliamentary institutions (in order to defend a territorial
interest at the higher level). The case is best illustrated in the case of Spain, where the
leading party in the lower chamber must often negotiate with pivotal parties (in
general Basque, Catalan, Galician and Canary Island nationalist parties) whose votes
are required to help it to pass government bills (ORTE and WILSON, 2009). Which, if
either, of these two conﬁgurations describe the Breton case?
That Breton politicians overwhelmingly share a ‘centrist’ political culture was
afﬁrmed often in interviews (especially those of 1995 and 2001). The political consensus
emphasised the legacy of Christian democracy from 1945 onwards, the development of a
Breton version of social democracy (from 1977) which shared key pro-European and
social partnership beliefs with its predecessor, and a mode of political co-operation
10 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
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over and above party lines. We should sound a note of caution. The Breton model of
consensus politics, built upon the Christian-democratic tradition and its legacy, was
never hegemonic and its existence is questionable today. The model excluded the
regionalist and autonomist movement (see below); and it did not prevent acrimonious
relationships between Socialists and the Christian Democrats, especially during the
1990s.14 By 2013, the Breton model of cross-partisan consensus was wearing thin.
The domination of the Socialist Party had become, by mid-2013, a withering
hegemony, challenged by factional divisions within the governing PS (Parti socialiste),
deteriorating relations with the Greens and the general unpopularity of the Hollande–
Ayrault administration and disappointment with the Bretons therein.15 The centrist
consensus that had sustained the Breton model appeared challenged by a more sharply
divided political cleavage structure, exempliﬁed by the red bonnet protests of
Autumn 2013.16 By 2014, the Breton model was also threatened by the good perform-
ance of the National Front (FN) in the municipal and European elections of 2014.17 In
2012, already, the FN presidential candidate Marine Le Pen obtained scores reaching
15–20% in some semi-urban spaces and isolated small towns. By 2014, Brittany was
no longer off-bounds for the FN.
Brittany is one of the few places that might be able to support an ethno-territorial
party. In the ROKKAN and URWIN (1982) schema, Brittany, combining economic under-
development with a strong cultural identity, ought to be a prime contender for a region
that develops a strong regionalist or nationalist movement. Breton politicians, for sound
instrumental and political reasons, have in the main chosen to operate through state-wide
parties. The political opportunity structure in the French Fifth Republic is so resolutely
Paris-centric that Breton forces have adapted accordingly. There remains a vibrant cul-
tural movement, however, that sustains the territorial identity (and direct action reper-
toire) upon which Breton elites draw when constructing the Breton interest. There is a
great deal of ambiguity in the interplay between the political and the cultural move-
ments. In one interpretation: ‘many very well known Breton cultural activists are also
openly nationalist. But they wear two hats and are careful, for funding reasons, not to
confuse political and cultural demands’.18 This ambivalence was illustrated in interviews
by the case of the fast-speed train and the proposed airport at Notre Dame des Landes.
Most interlocutors favoured extending the fast-speed train to Brest, in the far west of
Brittany (though opinions were more sharply divided on whether the Notre Dame
des Landes Airport should go ahead). De Rohan (President of the Brittany region
from 1998 to 2004) and Le Drian (President 2004–2012) combined their efforts to
plead Brittany’s case in Paris, on this and several other dossiers. A minority of cultural
activists was opposed to both, however, in the name of defending Breton identity.
The presence or not of a powerful regionalist party, the attitudes adopted by national
parties to issues of territorial identity, the rewards to be gained by emphasising one or
another level of governance: all of these are in part shaped by the party linkage function.
The party system performed an important role in representing the Breton interest,
usually through the main national parties, but also in traditions of cross-partisan collab-
oration in the higher interests of Brittany. This collective endeavour explains why more
robust forms of political leadership have not generally been necessary to defend the
Breton interest.
Collective Political Leadership
Political leadership is a neglected variable for understanding territorial dynamics. Rather
like supranational or national forms, studying territorial political leadership logically
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involves three main levels of analysis: the individual, the positional and the environ-
mental (LAGROYE, 1997; COLE, 2012). The individual level can refer to the mobilising
qualities of particular individuals. Media attention usually focuses on Livingstone or
Johnson as successive mayors of London or powerful mayors of French cities such as
Collomb in Lyons, or Delanöe in France. The positional level refers rather to the
capacity of particular institutional ofﬁces and party conﬁgurations to sustain clearly
identiﬁable forms (urban or regional) and styles (executive-centred or collective) of lea-
dership. Environmental constraints and opportunities present a third level of analysis.
The key variable here relates to the hierarchy and importance of the entity embodied
(the mayor of London or Paris, or the minister-president of a powerful German land
is usually a signiﬁcant national player as well). In the case of Spanish autonomous com-
munities or devolved governments in the UK (Salmond in Scotland, Mas in Catalonia in
particular), this level also involves consideration of the sometimes highly politicised and
conﬂictual forms of inter-governmental relationships.
In Brittany, collective regional leadership has a long pedigree. In the traditional post-
war model, defending the Breton interest occurred either via a parliamentary group (in
the Fourth Republic) or through Bretons operating within the leading parties, especially
the Socialist Party since the 1980s. Our 2001 interlocutors in Brittany were virtually
unanimous in praising the capacity of Breton actors to join forces to promote their
common interests and to defend Brittany against attacks from the outside world. The
leader of the Breton Socialists, later President of the Regional Council and Defense
Minister, expressed it thus in 2001: ‘In Brittany, we all believe in the merits of the
Breton compromise. Left and right are perfectly capable of coming together and
agreeing on the big questions that concern the region.’ The (then) Gaullist President
of the Brittany region shared this analysis.19 From René Pleven (the Breton PM in
the Fourth Republic committed to European integration) to Jean Yves Le Drian
(the inﬂuential Defense Minister under President Hollande, 2012–) the Breton
interest has been supported by inﬂuential Bretons operating in Paris and Brussels,
rather than by powerful regional leaders, per se. The example of Le Drian is instructive:
the Defense Minister (whose ministerial ofﬁce has a section devoted to following
Breton affairs20) informally doubles up as Minister for Brittany in the Valls government.
The paradox of political leadership is that Bretons have punched above their weight
in Paris and Brussels (where power lies) but that this modus operandi recalls the
current weakness of the Regional Council (far from being a powerful territorial
assembly).
As elsewhere in France, there is some evidence of competition from big city mayors
(traditionally from Edmond Hervé, the former mayor of Rennes (1977–2008)) but there
is less evidence of a visible metropolitan leadership than in many other French regions.
Neither of the two Breton métropoles—Brest and Rennes—can claim to be in the ﬁrst
rank of French cities.
Territorial Regimes
Capacity does not limit itself to institutional resources or leadership potentialities; it also
involves styles of co-operation between actors in well-deﬁned policy universes. As prac-
tices and norms are produced by interaction, networks are key to understanding territor-
ial dynamics. Postmodern regional geographers seek to challenge an outmoded image of
regions as cut-off and replace it with a vision of regions as a series of relationships, of
networked regions at the intersection of global connections. Although this image of
interconnected cities and regions ﬁnds support within the literature (PAASI, 2001;
12 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:1
0 2
8 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
SCOTT and STORPER, 2003; LE GALÈS, 2012), this approach has been criticised for the
tendency to expunge the notion of territory from regional studies. As AMIN (2004,
p. 36) observes, ‘the sum is cities and regions without prescribed or proscribed bound-
aries which translates into regional territories without rules to deﬁne them’.
Our approach is focused mainly on within-territory interactions. Which levels of
sub-national authority are at the centre of territorial interactions? Are local and regional
authorities able to federate interactions within territorial policy communities? Or do
powerful professional interests (business and trade unions in particular) look beyond
the sub-national level? Classic studies of urban regimes—ﬁrst in the USA (STONE,
1989), later in Europe (STOKER and MOSSBERGER, 1994; JOHN and COLE, 1998a)—
emphasised long-term coalitions between political and economic decision-makers as
being a fundamental part of urban governance. More formal network analysis (JOHN
and COLE, 1995; JOHN and COLE 1998b) has been used to demonstrate variation
between cities; while narrative accounts have reached similar conclusions in relation
to strong regions (BARONE, 2011). What is the appropriate level in the case of Brittany
(and how does this compare with other French regions)?
Political capacity is, at least in part, a process of mediation in which elites and social
groups produce a vision of the world that allows them at once to structure relations
among themselves and to deﬁne the ‘interests’ that they are pursuing collectively. In
Brittany, the CELIB (see above) provided well-documented evidence of a robust terri-
torial regime, which stabilised relations between political, economic and cultural actors
from the 1950s onwards (PASQUIER, 2004). This regional coalition negotiated a regional
development project and forced the state to support it. Sectoral committees within the
CELIB brought together all relevant regional stakeholders: farm leaders, university
researchers, business leaders, higher civil servants and other relevant experts were mobi-
lised to draw up a new model of the regional economy. Not only did the CELIB engage
the state in a dialogue concerning the necessity of increasing public-sector investment in
Brittany, but it also proposed alternatives to the solutions put forward by the national
administration and then ensured the diffusion of its ideas through publications, aimed
both at key decision-makers and at the general public. Today’s leaders have received
the model as an inheritance from the preceding generation. In their hands, it has been
adapted to contemporary conditions but the dialogue between political, economic
and cultural elites carries on. On the economic front, a new business association
‘Made in Brittany’ was created in 1995 to enhance Breton products and goods. Two
decades later, it represents more than 300 ﬁrms and 60,000 employees in Brittany and
has become a key interlocutor for regional political leaders. This economic association
adopts a broad Breton regional advocacy position, supporting proposals for a single
regional assembly and for the reuniﬁcation of historic Brittany. From this point of
view, the territorial regime of Brittany is stronger than ever.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF BRITTANY
Identity Logics
Interpreting territorial governance from an identity-based perspective implies looking to
regions, or stateless nations as historic, cultural and political entities and identifying ter-
ritorial networks or ethno-territorial parties sharing a common identity (DEWINTER and
TURSAN, 1998; GUIBERNAU, 1999; GAGNON and TULLY, 2001; GAGNON et al., 2006;
MORENO, 2007). Interpreting the region as a subject assumes understanding territories
as being more than individual units of analysis; rather as communities with shared mem-
ories, common inter-subjective meanings and a recognisable territorial action repertoire.
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Though sometimes considered as the archetype of the unitary state, modern France
also contains several territories with highly distinctive identities (of which Brittany,
Alsace, the Basque country, French Catalonia, Corsica and Savoy are the most
obvious examples). As expressed in an interview carried out by the authors with a
regional actor in July 2013, the problem with Brittany ‘lies in the 21 other French
regions’. In October–November 2013, the social movement of the ‘red bonnets’ illus-
trated the singularity of the Breton model of collective action. Using identity symbols
such the Breton ﬂag (Gwen ha du) and the red bonnet (the symbol of the Breton
revolt at the end of seventeenth century against a new tax imposed by the King Louis
XIV), this regional coalition composed of different groups (business owners, employees,
cultural associations and regionalist leaders) forced the central government to stop the
implementation of a new environmental tax and to pledge to negotiate a new economic
model for Brittany.21 This example conﬁrms survey evidence providing some support
for this framing of the Breton region as distinctive. DARGENT (2001) revealed that Brit-
tany was the only mainland French region with a sense of regional identity as strong as
that of its national belonging (i.e. French). COLE and EVANS (2007) concluded, on the
basis of survey evidence carried out in 2001 using the Moreno scale, that Bretons com-
bined a strong sense of regional (Breton) and national (French) identity, a ﬁnding con-
ﬁrmed by the 2009 CANS survey, according to which 75% of the Bretons interviewed
declared themselves, to varying degrees, to feel at least as Breton as French (HENDERSEN
et al., 2014).22
Territorial identity can matter more than budget-maximising or abstract scalar calcu-
lations. This preference was demonstrated in the June 2014 horse-trading over the new
regional map, when former regional President (and incumbent Defense Minister) Le
Drian preferred to maintain the administrative region of Brittany as it currently stands,
rather than accept a larger region including all of the Pays de la Loire region. Though
the current administrative region is composed of four departments (Côtes d’Armor,
Finistère, Ille et Vilaine and Morbihan), the historical boundaries of Brittany included
a ﬁfth department, the Loire-Atlantique, in which is located the city of Nantes, historical
capital of the Duchy of Brittany. In 1955–1956, when the map of the French regions was
drawn up, Nantes had been separated from Brittany to act as the capital of a new region,
the Pays de la Loire. From this period onwards, there has been a traditional tension
between Breton political and cultural elites seeking a reuniﬁcation of historical Brittany
and those preferring a larger region including all of the Pays de la Loire region. The
tension between these two coalitions was revived in 2014. Caught in the crossﬁre
between Le Drian (and most Breton elites, backed by public opinion) in favour of the
reuniﬁcation of historic Brittany, and former Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault
(who, former of mayor of Nantes, also resisted the ﬁve department solution and pro-
posed the fusion between Brittany and Pays de Loire), President Hollande chose to
maintain Brittany and Pays de la Loire as separate regions with their existing boundaries.
Breton political elites preferred not to dilute their region into either a vast Western
France or a merged Brittany–Pays de la Loire region, even if this meant that the
coveted Nantes would remain outside.
Territorial Action Repertoires?
The territorial répertoire, which centres on the practices and discursive registers adopted
by actors over time, completes the presentation of our framework. TILLY’S (1984,
pp. 89–108) concept of the collective action répertoire was initially developed to
uncover historical regularities in forms of social protest. It has been usefully adapted
14 Alistair Cole and Romain Pasquier
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ard
iff
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 0
7:1
0 2
8 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
4 
by writers such as KEATING (1998) to studying the processes of social and institutional
mobilisation in Western European regions. Practices form the analytical core of the ter-
ritorial répertoire. Are there speciﬁc practices and modes of operation that distinguish
Bretons over time? Are there modes of routine behaviour (the combination of direct
action and lobbying, for example) that have proved effective in the past and that are a
natural response to crisis situations? Following practices come discourses. SCHMIDT’s
(2010) theory of discursive institutionalism might also have heuristic value in under-
standing territorial regimes: how actors communicate and share ideas is critical for under-
standing continuities and changes in policy universes.
PASQUIER (2004) summarises the Breton territorial repertoire in the following terms:
the regional space is a legitimate one, not an artiﬁcial construct; actors share the common
referents of Brittany as a backward region that needs to be modernised and deserves
special treatment; actors seek to build regional consensus, over and above departmental
and local rivalries; the Breton policy community seeks a collaborative mode of govern-
ance and to build a measure of trust in relations with central government (but using
direct action tactics to back this up). There are shared views on the regional interest
and a shared belief in negotiating with the French state as an equal partner. The sense
of regional identity goes much deeper than the electoral performance or otherwise of
an explicitly regionalist party. There was very strong support in interviews at all three
periods for strengthening the regional political institution and for vesting the Brittany
regional council with a leadership role in relation to other sub-national authorities.
There was widespread support, among almost everybody interviewed in 2001–2002
(irrespective of party), for enhanced regional powers in the spheres of education,
culture, historic monuments, transport, training, regional languages and, to a lesser
degree, health. If anything, there was an even stronger consensus in favour of enhanced
regional powers in 2013, coupled with a sense of disillusion with the inability of Breton
politicians to inﬂuence the incumbent Ayrault government in favour of more
regionalisation.
Our longitudinal investigation allows us to break down the Breton territorial action
repertoire into core themes, selected in terms of frequency of response over the three
periods to two linked questions. The ﬁrst of these related to the qualities of the
region itself and the mode of operation of relationships therein:23 this question was
designed as an inductive means of uncovering regularities, both synchronically (by com-
paring three distinct groups of actors within Brittany) and diachronically (comparing
responses to similar questions over time). A second question asked in 2001–2002 and
2013 looked to the future, namely ‘what are the main challenges that decision-
makers in Brittany face over the next ten years’.24 The ﬁrst question was designed to
elicit perspectives on the constants and contingent variables of the Breton territorial
action repertoire; the second question was intended to provide a cross-sectional over-
view of perceived priorities.
In Brittany We Do Things Differently
The statement obtaining the highest score was: ‘In Brittany we do things differently’.25
Interviewees across the three periods referred to a Brittany effect, particularly in relation
to the outside world. Though conﬂicts within Brittany could be ﬁerce, there was a
common front presented to the outside, whether the French state, the EU or other
regions and countries. Some interviewees referred to Brittany’s past as an independent
Duchy, a degree of autonomy they equated with pre-uniﬁcation Scotland.26 Politicians
from all parties, including the UMP, have a tradition of joining forces and defending the
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Breton interest in Paris (and Brussels). Some evidence of this was provided in interviews,
notably concerning the common cause of all Breton parties to obtain central govern-
ment investment in the high-speed train (LGV project) or in relation to the role of
Breton language teaching as part of the normal school curriculum.27
The Twin Faces of the Breton Negotiating Model
Strong linkages with Paris and Brussels are combined with a willingness to resort to direct
action tactics to further Breton objectives. Direct action strategies are an established part
of the collective action repertoire, sensu stricto, which mobilises symbols of Breton iden-
tity—the Breton ﬂag, music, occasionally the language—in order to defend narrow
economic interests. Direct action forms part of a longer term collective action
memory. In the protests against the eco-taxe of Autumn 2013, for example, striking
workers and farmers wore red bonnets, an allusion to the anti-tax protests of the seven-
teenth century. Two decades earlier, rioting farmers and ﬁsherman caused the burning of
the Breton Parliament in 1994. Road blockages and rail sabotage were adopted to
further the Breton cause in the 1960s and 1970s. The ability to resort to direct action
demonstrates one of the twin faces of the Breton repertoire that does not sit easily
with other more negotiated representations, and notably that the Bretons are politically
centrist. In TILLY’S (1984) model of the collective action repertoire, the dynamics of
social protest are rooted in a historically long time frame. The Breton collective
action register drew as much from the eighteenth-century repertoire in pre-revolution-
ary France (the preservation of the historic rights of speciﬁc territorial communities
(refusal to pay tolls, for example), the defence of local communities or corps (defence
of the language), and adopting a common cause with employers to negotiate with
central authority (with Breton employers such as Armor Lux or Tilly Sabco joining in
Table 2. Breton political capacity 1995–2014: the direction of change.
Indicator Comments Direction of change 1995–2014
Institutional resources Low score comparatively, but robust
informal institutions
Gradual strengthening of the regional
level domestically (+)
Economic proﬁle Region in slow decline in national
rankings
Breton economic model challenged by
some aspects of economic
globalisation (−)
IGRs and multi-level
governance
IGR model stronger than ever.
Strategic Europeanisation
challenged by economic crisis
Shift from strategic to normative
Europeanisation?(−)
Political leadership Collective, regional and removed Stable, based on pursuing the Breton
interest by ﬁrst-rank politicians in
Paris (=)
Party system More sharply divided cleavage
structure
Capacity for pursuing the Breton
interest remains powerful (=)
Territorial regimes Region-centric networks Stable (=)
Identity logics: Regional identity makes sense
culturally, economically and
institutionally
Stable (=)
Even instrumental drivers (e.g. the
regional map) are seen through lens of
regional identity
Territorial narratives
and modes of
regulation
Repertoire of lobbying and direct
action
Renewed vigour (+)
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the social movement)), as it did from a more ‘modern’ nineteenth-century repertoire
(the practice of direct action exercised on public authorities). While negotiations
stalled in Autumn 2013, direct action produced immediate pay-offs: Brittany was the
object of a full Council of Ministers meeting (in October 2013) and a far-reaching
plan in December 2013 (in the pure tradition of the CELIB).
CONCLUSION
In the introduction, the core research question was presented as: What are the conditions
for a successful form of regional advocacy in the model of a unitary state? Regional advo-
cacy in Brittany has been effective insofar as it has combined heightened regional con-
sciousness with an awareness of the most effective modes of operation within the
political opportunity structure of the French polity. Brittany has a speciﬁc mode of oper-
ation, one based on mixing identity and instrumental claims, and accessing a repertoire of
responses that are not naturally open to other French regions. Identity markers are very
present in dealings with Paris, in claims made upon public resources, in the demand for
differential treatment and resentment of ‘Jacobin’ logic of centralisation. The favoured
mode of operation is an elite-level one, but it can also draw upon a social movement
that uses the symbols of regional identity and cultural distinctiveness to strengthen its
case. Territorial distinctiveness does not express itself by a powerful ethno-territorial
party, which would be counterproductive. One Breton autonomist interviewed in
2013 estimated the audience for the main autonomist party, the Democratic Breton
Union (UDB) at 3–5%.28 Though the political opportunity structure is not conducive
to political regionalism, in the case of Brittany a powerful cultural movement provides
an inﬂuential milieu for both regionalist and French parties (STORPER, 1995). No other
French region (qua region) is able to combine regionality and regional advocacy in
this way. However, the broader context remains one of limited decentralisation in a
unitary state: the French regions have modest legal powers or ﬁnancial capacities, and
(at the time of writing) these have not been substantially strengthened by recent decen-
tralisation reforms of 2004, 2010 or 2013–2014. Hence, the continuing reliance on a
speciﬁc model of regional advocacy, however imperfect, has demonstrated its capacity
to produce public goods.
These observations lead directly to the second question: Can a speciﬁc territorial
model (the ‘Breton model’) developed in one set of conditions adapt when circum-
stances change? The method adopted throughout the article is inspired in part by discus-
sions over Schmidt’s discursive institutionalism, which understands institutions as sets of
understandings, ways of knowing, practices and routines that are embedded within
recognisable structures. In the speciﬁc case of Brittany, the territorial action repertoire
might be interpreted as a form of discursive institutionalism, a mix of beliefs, ways of
operating, routines and practices that make sense over time. For SCHMIDT (2008,
p. 303) what ‘actors think and say’ is key to understanding change. As presented here,
however, the Breton territorial model of 2013 had a rather defensive character. Depart-
ing from one of the central tenets of discursive institutionalism, our survey of Brittany
casts some doubt on the endogenous character of change. The core drivers of change
lie beyond the discourse and involve changing material realities. External factors
include the impact of economic crisis on a model relying heavily on external investment,
changes to the farm subsidy regime, a certain disillusion with the EU and the bureau-
cratisation of scarce resources. Internal factors include the diminishing returns associated
with three decades of PS hegemony, the economic crisis and its spillover in rural and
semi-urban France and the lessening ﬁscal capacity of the French state. These heavy
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variables underpin the evolution of the Breton model. The Breton case demonstrates
limited evidence of endogenous change (a central tenet of discursive institutionalism),
though it does admit a continuing capacity to ﬁlter external pressures in a way that
makes sense to regional actors. The evidence supports another established hypothesis,
drawn from Bourdieu, whereby actors interpret crisis in terms of their existing mental
maps or habitus (DOBRY, 2009).
Above all, the article has developed territorial political capacity as a hybrid framework
for understanding and comparing cases of territorial governance across time and space. In
the speciﬁc case of Brittany, Table 2 outlines the direction of change from 1995 to 2014,
corresponding to the long ﬁeldwork period.
Of our eight indicators, four are broadly stable (regional collective political leadership,
a party systemwhere regional advocacy occurs through state-wide parties, region-centric
networks and regional identity logics), two are in progression (the force of regional insti-
tutions and territorial narratives), while two appear in retreat (Breton economic capacity
(especially in western Brittany) and the weakening of strategic Europeanisation). If the
architecture of the Breton model remains recognisably robust, the weakening of the
material capacity indicators contains more generic lessons for Europe’s regions, especially
that family that we label as second-order strong identity regions. In the context of econ-
omic crisis—and in contrast to the family of richer, ‘ﬁrst-order’ strong identity regions
such as Flanders and Catalonia—regions such as Brittany (or Andalusia, Wales and Wal-
lonia) use territorial identity claims above all to promote solidarity and ﬁscal transfers. In
these regions, the pursuit of socio-economic interests and preservation of existing
welfare traditions and ﬁnancial transfers place boundaries on using territorial identity
to support more autonomous forms of governance. As a more general point, frameworks
for understanding territorial governance need to accommodate family resemblances
(COLLIER and MAHON, 1993) and operationalise ‘most similar’ approaches that allow
for comparison in categories such as global cities, city-regions, ﬁrst- and second-order
strong identity regions, and peri-urban and rural zones. The territorial political capacity
framework proposes a heuristically useful theoretical mix that facilitates the understand-
ing of how actors construct their political actions over time, how accepted ways of oper-
ating inﬂuence forms of collective action and how actors can continue to be mobilised
by existing discourses and practices, even when circumstances are changing.
There are strict limits to any territorial capacity, even for the strongest European
regions that are faced with pressures of economic convergence, enhanced central steer-
ing and global economic competition. Within these strictly bounded limits, Bretons, via
their relationships and modes of operation, have mediated change. The events of
Autumn 2013—the crisis, the direct action and the temporary resolution by a
promise of central state investment—recalled how effective the instrumental use of iden-
tity politics could be in the short term. Bretons revolted and Breton achieved short-term
gains. The social movement of Autumn 2013 conﬁrmed key features of the territorial
action repertoire, most speciﬁcally the efﬁcacy of direct relationships with Paris, the
instrumental use of identity, the spectre of disorder, the mobilisation of past symbols
of Brittany’s speciﬁcity, the united front of (some) Breton employers29 and employees
in defence of their collective territorial goods. The Breton actors interviewed in 2013
were deeply conscious, however, of the limits of existing modes of collective action
and the need to reinvent a new model.
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NOTES
1. The analysis for this article is mainly based on 87 semi-structured interviews carried out with
political, associative and economic actors in Brittany at three stages in the past two decades: in
1995 (28 interviews), 2001–2002 (30 interviews) and in 2013 (29 interviews). In each of the
periods of empirical investigation, three sub-groups were identiﬁed: party political actors (the
main party families), public administration actors (generally working for the region, the
regional state or public agencies) and the policy community (especially representatives of
employers, trade unions, business groups and cultural associations). The interviews were
taped and transcribed.
2. The CANS 2009 survey interviewed samples of 900 people in 14 regions (HENDERSEN et al.,
2014). The earlier survey (2001) involved a representative sample of 1000 and was funded as
part of ESRC project L219252007.
3. The empirical data forms part of the Leverhulme Trust’s International Network on
‘Territorial Governance in Western Europe: between Convergence and Capacity’ (IN-
2012-109).
4. Interview with the vice president in charge of budgetary affairs, August 2013, an account
conﬁrmed in other interviews and formal statistics.
5. Interviews, Regional Prefect, 2010 and Regional General Affairs Secretariat, 2013.
6. B (for Brittany)16 is the generic name given to the regular sectoral meetings between the
region, the departments, the main cities and other stakeholders. The precise format varies
according to sector. One interviewee described the process of a B16 in youth policy in
the Brittany region:
The B16 brings together the main actors involved in youth policy in Brittany, from the
region, the main department and the cities, notably. Through the B.16 we share a
common methodology for dealing with youth issues–unique in France, though the
region does not have formal competence in issues of youth policy.
7. Interview, 2013.
8. The founder of the CELIB, Joseph Martray, interviewed in 2002, emphasised the combi-
nation of lobbying pressures with direct action tactics, such as blocking trains, to further
the Breton cause.
9. Interview, 2001.
10. Brittany was politically contested insofar as some Breton autonomists had sided with
Germany during the war. A small brigade fought alongside the Germans.
11. Interview at the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, France section,
December 2008.
12. Interview, September 2013.
13. The EU announced, in July 2013, that it was withdrawing its export subsidies for poultry
producers with immediate effect.
14. One well-placed interlocutor, interviewed in 1995, afﬁrmed: ‘Méhaignerie and Hervé are so
unlike that they cannot understand each other. They dislike each other personally and dis-
agree politically.’
15. Interview, 2013.
16. The UMP initially refused to sit around the table with other Breton politicians.
17. In the 2014 European election, the FN list came a close second behind the UMP—but well
ahead of the Socialist list. Earlier in 2014, the FN had elected its ﬁrst municipal councillors in
Brittany.
18. Interview, 2001.
19. Interviews, 2001 (Le Drian) and 2002 (de Rohan).
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20. Interview, Pierrick Massiot’s cabinet, 2013.
21. The movement organised large and mediatised events, such as that of 2 November 2013 in
Quimper, where 25,000 ‘red bonnet’ protesters urged the cancellation of the new tax and the
granting of more regional power for Brittany.
22. In the Breton survey, 25% expressed either an exclusive (2%) or a predominant (23%) Breton
identity, while 50% declared themselves to be ‘as Breton as French’. In Alsace, 18% were
exclusively or predominantly regional (42% equally national and regional), while in Ile-
de-France only 8% felt exclusively or predominantly regional (30% equally national and
regional).
23. The precise questions asked were: What are the main traits of the Breton model? (2001,
2013). Is there a Breton model? Has it remained constant over time? (1995). What is the
speciﬁcity of the Brittany region? (1995).
24. This question was asked in each of the semi-structured interviews that formed part of our
survey.
25. Interview, 2001.
26. Interview (Ronan le Prohon, UDB), 2001.
27. Providing regular scheduled hours for Breton classes was hailed as a major advance in several
interviews.
28. Interview, UDB, August 2013.
29. A note of scepticism was sounded in some of the 2013 interviews, especially in relation to
Doux, whose owner had reputedly invested EU funds in new factories in Brazil that were
now competing with Breton producers.
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